We study cooperative interval games. These are cooperative games where the value of a coalition is given by a closed real interval specifying a lower bound and an upper bound of the possible outcome. For interval cooperative games, several (interval) solution concepts have been introduced in the literature. We assume that each player has a different attitude towards uncertainty by means of the so-called Hurwicz coefficients. These coefficients specify the degree of optimism that each player has, so that an interval becomes a specific payoff. We show that a classical cooperative game arises when applying the Hurwicz criterion to each interval game. On the other hand, the same Hurwicz criterion can be also applied to any interval solution of the interval cooperative game. Given this, we say that a solution concept is Hurwicz compatible if the two procedures provide the same final payoff allocation. When such compatibility is possible, we characterize the class of compatible solutions, which reduces to the egalitarian solution when symmetry is required. The Shapley value and the core solution cases are also discussed.
Introduction
Given a set of agents (or players), cooperative (or transferable utility) games assign to each coalition of agents a real number which represents the maximum utility that the members of this coalition can assure by themselves. Cooperative game theory has addressed these problems by proposing relevant solutions, or values, that suggest one or several payoff allocations satisfying certain desirable properties. Typically, the most standard property is efficiency, which implies that the worth of the grand coalition is shared. Some examples of efficient solutions are the core, the Weber set, the Shapley value, and the nucleolus.
Cooperative interval games generalize the idea of cooperative games by assigning to each coalition a closed interval. Analogously, efficient interval solutions propose an allocation of the interval generated by the grand coalition. Many of the classical solutions have been defined in the context of cooperative interval games by Alparslan-Gok et al. (2008) ; Alparslan Gök et al. (2009c) . See Branzei et al. (2010) for a survey.
Interval games have been applied to bankruptcy problems (Branzei and Alparslan Gök, 2008) , airport games Alparslan Gök et al. (2009a) , minimum cost spanning tree problems (Montemanni, 2006; Moretti et al., 2011) , assignment problems (Pereira and Averbakh, 2011; van den Brink et al., 2017; Wu et al., 2018) , and sequencing games (Alparslan-Gök et al., 2013) .
A classical interpretation of the intervals is that each of them represents the possible worth range that a coalition can get by themselves. Examples are those that appear from the so-called games with externalities (Thrall and Lucas, 1963) , where the worth of a coalition depends not only on the coalition itself, but also on how the rest of the players cooperate.
1 van den Brink et al. (2017) propose a different motivation, where the worth of a coalition varies between the (classical) pessimistic assumption that the rest of players will try to harm them as much as possible, and the most optimistic assumption given by the dual problem.
At this point, we have to distinguish between risk and uncertainty. In a risky situation, players are unsure of the final result of their own cooperation, but they can assign a precise probability to each possible outcome. This kind of riskiness has been deeply studied in the economic literature, both from a cooperative and non-cooperative point of view. Frequently, it is assumed that each player has some private information and 1 For example, assume that players form an oligopoly that plans to create a cartel. The cartel can then anticipate their benefit as a monopoly. However, if two or more players are not present, the remaining players can not anticipate their exact benefit, as it would depend on whether the other players merge or not.
a precise knowledge of the probability distribution of how the others are. Yet, this approach does not fit into the model proposed by interval games, where each interval does not depend on the private information of the players. In other situations, probability distribution is common knowledge but their consequences are not homogeneous among players (Alparslan- Gök et al., 2013) . Again, this approach neither fits interval games, where each interval is coalition-dependent.
As opposed, under uncertainty, players are not only unsure of the final outcome of their potential cooperation, but also of the probability of these possible outcomes. When there is no private information, i.e. all the players agree on the uncertainty that lies behind the cooperation of each coalition, interval games provide a more realistic interpretation of uncertainty.
An interval solution is then a way to share the uncertainty of the grand coalition worth taking into account the uncertain worth of each coalition.
Given this, each player can have a different attitude towards uncertainty. For example, a pessimistic player would prefer to maximize the minimum possible outcome (maximin criterion), so that its preferred payoff is an interval with a high lower bound, whereas an optimistic (maximax criterion) player would prefer intervals with a high upper bound.
An intermediate approach (Laplace criterion or criterion of rationality) is to assume all the possible outcomes are equally probable, in the sense that they follow an uniform distribution. Hence, players with a Laplace criterion prefer intervals with a high midpoint.
A generalization of these criteria is the so-called Hurwicz criterion (Hurwicz, 1951) , which states that there exists a fixed coefficient between 0 and 1 that measures the degree of optimism. Hence, a pessimistic player would have a coefficient 0, an optimistic one 1, and a rational one (in the sense of Laplace)
Obviously, once the Hurwicz coefficients are stated for each player, uncertainty disappears and players can uniquely assign a concrete value to each interval. The payoff allocation of the grand coalition interval becomes a payoff allocation for the grand coalition. We can then check the payoff allocation proposed by each interval solution.
In this paper, we study what happens when this statement of the coefficients is done on the interval game, prior to applying any interval value. We prove (Proposition 3.1) that this operation generates a (classical) cooperative game, so that we can compute its interval value.
2 2 Other applications of Hurwicz coefficients in interval games appear in Lardon (2017) and Li (2016) , who also deduce a (classical) cooperative game by using a selection via degrees of optimism. However, these degrees are coalition-dependent, not individual. Hence, they cannot be identified as Hurwicz coefficients in the same way we do here.
Hence, we can proceed in two ways. On the one hand, we can compute the interval value on the interval game, and then apply the Hurwicz criterion. On the other hand, we can apply the Hurwicz criterion in the interval game in order to get a (classical) cooperative game, then apply the interval solution.
3 We are interested in studying which values are compatible in the sense that both procedures provide the same final payoff allocation.
This property has the potential of solving situations where players have uncertain needs for a resource when it has to be divided before uncertainty resolves (Xue, 2018 (Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000) . It is worthy to note that usual characterizations of the egalitarian solution heavily rely on the properties of either additivity (Béal et al., 2016 (Béal et al., , 2019 Bergantiños and Vidal-Puga, 2004; Casajus and Huettner, 2014a; Hougaard and Moulin, 2018; van den Brink, 2007; van den Brink et al., 2015) or monotonicity Huettner (2013, 2014b) , which are not required here.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present the notation.
In Section 3, we define the Hurwicz criterion and prove that it can only be applied in two particular situations, which are analysed in Section 4 and Section 5, respectively. In Section 6, we focus on the core. In Section 7, we present some concluding remarks.
3 This is always possible to do, since interval cooperative games generalize classical ones.
Notation
Let I := ia = ia, ia : ia, ia ∈ R, ia ≤ ia be the set of closed intervals in R. Given ia, ib ∈ I, we say that ia ib when ia ≤ ib and ia ≤ ib. Given x ∈ R + and iy = iy, iy ∈ I, we define x · iy := x · iy, x · iy ∈ I. Given α j ∈ R and ia = ia, ia ∈ I, we define
Given ia, ib ∈ I, we define ia⊕ib := ia + ib, ia + ib ∈ I, and ia⊘ib := ia − ib, ia − ib ∈ I; moreover, when ia − ib ≤ ia − ib, we define ia
with the convention that ia∈∅ ia :
Let N = {1, . . . , n} be a finite set of players. A coalitional interval game is a pair
function that assigns a closed interval iv(S) = iv(S), iv(S)
to each coalition S ⊆ N with the property that iv(∅) = [0, 0], i.e. iv(∅) = iv(∅) = 0. Let IG N denote the class of all coalitional interval games with N as set of players. Since N is fixed, from now on we write iv instead of (N, iv) and IG instead of IG N .
Notice that coalitional interval games generalize classical coalitional (transferable utility, or TU) games. Just take iv(S) = iv(S) for all S ⊆ N . There are three trivial TU games associated to any iv ∈ IG. These are the border games iv and iv, and the length game |iv| given by |iv|(S) = iv(S) − iv(S) for all S ⊆ N . Let G denote the set of TU games with N as player set. With some abuse of notation, we assume G ⊂ IG.
Apart from coalitional interval games, another generalization of TU games are nontransferable utility games, or NTU games. An NTU game V with player set N is given by a characteristic function V : 2 N → S⊆N R S , with the convention R ∅ = {0}, satisfying, for all S ⊆ N :
Any TU game v can be written as an NTU game V as follows:
Notice that we can write any interval game iv ∈ IG applying natural generalization of NTU games as follows:
for all S ⊆ N . We then say that iV is an interval game written in NTU form.
A relevant class of coalitional interval games is the following (Alparslan Gök et al., 2009b) . A coalitional interval game iv is size monotonic if |iv|(S) ≤ |iv|(T ) for all S ⊆ T ⊆ N . We denote as SMIG the set of size monotonic interval game with N as player set. Clearly, all TU games are size monotonic interval games, i.e. G ⊂ SMIG.
A solution in the set of TU games is a function σ : G → R N that assigns to each
solution in the set of TU games is the Shapley value (Shapley, 1953) .
Let IB be a subset of IG such that it contains all the TU games, i.e. G ⊆ IB. An efficient solution for IB is a function iσ : IB → I N that assigns to each iv ∈ IB a payoff allocation iσ(iv) ∈ I N such that j∈N iσ j (iv) = iv(N ) for all iv ∈ IB.
Hurwicz criterion
The most well-known criterion to deal with uncertainty was first stated by Hurwicz (1951) .
Assume that each player j ∈ N has a coefficient α j ∈ [0, 1] which determines its degree of optimism. This means that if player j faces an interval ia ∈ I, its individual valuation of it will be α j • ia.
Given α ∈ [0, 1] N and an interval game solution iσ : IB → I N , we define α • iσ :
IB → R N as the function given by applying the Hurwicz criterion to iσ with coefficients in α, i.e.
for all iv ∈ IB and all j ∈ N .
Analogously, given α ∈ [0, 1] N and iv ∈ IG, we define α • iV as the NTU game given by applying the Hurwicz criterion to each iv(S) with coefficients in α. Formally,
for all S ⊆ N , where iV is defined as in (1). As usual, −R S + allows us to assure comprehensivity (despite the incompleteness of the partial order ).
N and iv ∈ IG, the associated NTU game α • iV is equivalent to the TU game α • iv defined as follows:
Take S ⊆ N , |S| > 1, and k ∈ arg max j∈S α j . In case of more than one possible k, we take any one of them. Let T = S \ {k} = ∅. For each ia ∈ I, let |ia| := ia − ia. Then,
Given that x ∈ R S is only restricted by j∈S x j = iv(S), this amount iv(S) can be freely transferable among the players, so that the Pareto frontier is reached when j∈S α j y j is maximum, given that y ∈ R N + and j∈S y j = |iv|(S). Since α k ≥ α j for all j ∈ S, this maximum is α k · |iv|(S), reached at least when y k = |iv|(S) and y j = 0 otherwise. Hence,
Under Proposition 3.1, any coalitional interval game iv ∈ IG turns into a unique TU game α • iv ∈ G by applying the Hurwicz criterion with coefficients in α.
Given α ∈ [0, 1] N and an interval game solution iσ : IB → I N , we define iσ • α :
IB → R N as the function given by applying iσ to α • iv for each iv ∈ IB, i.e.
for all iv ∈ IB and j ∈ N .
Notice that both (2) and (5) apply an interval solution and the Hurwicz criterion with some coefficients. The difference between both approaches is the order in which they do so.
It is then natural to require this order to be irrelevant, i.e. both α • iσ and iσ • α should coincide. We call this property Hurwicz compatibility. Formally,
for all efficient solution iσ : IG → I N . Moreover, equality holds iff either
Proof. Under efficiency,
Equality holds iff
which is equivalent to either α j = α k for all j, k ∈ N or |iσ j (iv)| = 0 for all j ∈ N . Since |x| is always nonnegative, this second condition is equivalent to |iv|(N ) = 0.
Corollary 3.1 No efficient solution in the set of (size monotonic) coalitional interval games is Hurwicz compatible.
In view of Proposition 3.2, we can only find Hurwicz compatibility in efficient solutions
when we restrict ourselves to two possible situations:
1. All the Hurwicz coefficients coincide (equal degree of optimism).
2. There is no uncertainty when all players cooperate (grand coalition certainty).
Uniform degree of optimism
In this Section we study which interval solutions are Hurwicz compatible when all coefficients coincide.
Definition 4.1 Given IB ⊆ IG, an interval game solution iσ :
all iv ∈ IB, where α j = α 0 for all j ∈ N .
Let us consider a coalitional interval game iv and α ∈ [0, 1] N the vector of players'
Hurwicz coefficients. We denote α S := max j∈S α j and
We consider here the Shapley value of the TU game α • iv, i.e.
for each j ∈ N . On the class of size monotonic coalitional interval games, Alparslan Gök et al. (2010) define a generalization of the Shapley value, which we call the interval Alparslan Gök-Brânzei-Tijs (ABT) solution, as follows:
for each iv ∈ SMIG and each j ∈ N . Analogously, Han et al. (2012) define another generalization of the Shapley value, which we call the interval Han-Sun-Xu (HSX) solution, as follows:
for each iv ∈ IG and each j ∈ N .
Proposition 4.1 The interval ABT solution is uniform Hurwicz compatible in SMIG.
Proof. The interval ABT solution can be written as
for each iv ∈ SMIG and each j ∈ N . Since all the Hurwicz coefficients coincide (α 1 =
for each iv ∈ SMIG and each j ∈ N . 
for all iv ∈ IG and all j ∈ N .
Proof. (⇐) Assume iσ is defined as in (7). It is clear that such a solution is efficient.
We now check that it is uniform Hurwicz compatible. Fix iv ∈ IG. Let α 0 ∈ [0, 1] and 
and
Since both iv and iv are TU games, we deduce that iσ only depends on its restriction on TU games, i.e., once we define iσ(v) for each v ∈ G, we can deduce iσ(iv) for any other iv ∈ IG. Moreover, given v, w ∈ G with v(S) ≤ w(S) for all S ⊆ N , it holds iσ(v) ≤ iσ(w) (otherwise, iσ(iw) with iw(S) = [v(S), w(S)] for all S ⊆ N would not be well-defined). Now, for each v ∈ G, define v − , v + ∈ G as follows:
For each x ∈ R, define u x ∈ G as follows:
i.e. the only relevant value is v(N ). Let
for all x ∈ R. Now, we prove that
for all j ∈ N , all α 0 ∈ [0, 1], and all x ∈ R. We assume x > 0. Case x < 0 is analogous and case x = 0 is trivial. Define iu 0x ∈ IG as follows:
Hence, for each j ∈ N ,
by uniform Hurwicz compatibility of iσ:
Figure 1: Visual proof that (12) implies (13).
and hence (12) holds. This implies that there exist δ j , γ j ∈ R such that
for all x ∈ R (see Figure 1) .
By efficiency of iσ:
Finally, for all iv ∈ IG and all j ∈ N ,
In particular, when δ j = δ k and γ j = γ k for all j, k ∈ N , then δ j = 0 and γ j = 1 n for all j ∈ N , and so we obtain the interval egalitarian solution:
An important implication of Theorem 4.1 is the following: 
Grand coalition certainty
Let IC denote the set of interval coalitional games iv ∈ IG satisfying iv(N ) = iv(N ).
Clearly, G ⊂ IC.
A simple family of efficient solutions in IC is given by
for all j ∈ N , where ω(x) ∈ R N satisfies j∈N ω j (x) = x for all x ∈ R. In particular, when ω j (x) = ω k (x) for all j, k ∈ N and all x ∈ R, we obtain the interval egalitarian solution restricted to IC. 
for all x ∈ R and all j ∈ N . By efficiency of σ, we deduce j∈N ω j (x) = x for all x ∈ R.
We prove that σ(iv) = iE ω (iv) for all iv ∈ IC by induction on the cardinality of
Assume first |Θ(iv)| = 0. Then, iv = ie iv(N ) and hence
Assume now the result holds when the cardinality of Θ(iv) is less than θ > 0, and let
We have three cases:
Case 1: 0 ∈ iv(S). Since S ∈ Θ(iv), we deduce that there exists some α 0 ∈ [0, 1] such that 0 = α 0 • iv(S). Let α j = α 0 for all j ∈ N and let iv −S ∈ IC defined as follows:
compatibility of iσ and the induction hypothesis,
Case 2: 0 < iv(S). Let α j = 1 for all j ∈ N . Let iv −0,S ∈ IC defined as follows:
and we proceed as in Case 1 with iv −0,S .
Case 3: iv(S) < 0. Let α j = 0 for all j ∈ N . Let iv +0,S ∈ IC defined as follows:
and we proceed as in Case 1 with iv +0,S .
An important implication of Theorem 5.1 is the following:
Theorem 5.2 The interval egalitarian solution is the only efficient and symmetric Hurwicz compatible solution in IC.
Proof. It follows from Theorem 5.1 and the fact that the interval egalitarian solution is the only symmetric one in the family of efficient, Hurwicz compatible interval solutions in IC.
A comment on the core
Let us consider a cooperative interval game iv ∈ IG and α ∈ [0, 1] N . For any coalition S ⊆ N , we denote α S = max j∈S α j . The core of the TU game α • iv ∈ G defined as in (4) is the set:
The interval core
The interval core with N players as defined in Alparslan Gök et al. (2009a) is the set
In this case, we can apply the Hurwicz criterion to iC(iv) and obtain the set 
Proof. Let us consider x ∈ α • iC(iv). Then, x j = ia j + α 0 |ia j | for each j ∈ N and
and, for any S ⊆ N ,
Observe that inclusion (14) also holds when iC(iv) = ∅. Inclusion
is not always true, as in the following example. Then we can deduce the next result.
Proposition 6.2 The interval core is not uniform Hurwicz compatible in IG.
Remark 6.1 In we consider in the previous example certainty in the grand coalition, in particular if we assume iv({1, 2}) = [2, 2], we have still that the inclusion C(α • iv) ⊆ α • iC(iv) does not hold.
The interval square core
Given an interval cooperative game iv ∈ IG, we call border games the two (classical) cooperative games defined as iv and iv where for any S ⊆ N , iv(S) = iv(S), iv(S) . In
Alparslan Gök et al. (2009c) , the square interval core C (iv) C iv is defined as C (iv) C iv := ia ∈ I N : j∈N ia j = iv(N ), ia ∈ C (iv) , ia ∈ C iv and it has been proved that if iC(iv) = ∅ then C (iv) C iv = iC(iv). Then, the same considerations of the interval core on the Hurwicz compatibility can be done.
Concluding remarks
In this paper we study interval cooperative games. These are games where the worth of coalitions are uncertain. Both a lower and an upper bound of the possible final outcome is assigned to each coalition. For these games, several solution concepts provide interval allocations to the players and leave uncertainty on the exit. In order to mitigate this uncertainty, assuming some degree of optimism (or pessimism) of the players (given by real numbers between 0 and 1), we introduce a TU cooperative game applying the Hurwicz criterion. This procedure allows to have a standard solution concept once the degree of optimism is fixed.
Another possibility for approaching the uncertainty is the following: consider any interval solution concept in the original interval game and then apply the Hurwicz criterion to the interval allocation. The question posed in the paper is if the two approaches lead to the same result. The idea of Hurwicz compatibility is given and we investigate under which conditions it holds. In the case of a uniform degree of optimism/pessimism or of the grand coalition certainty, we prove that the only compatible solutions are the proportional ones, or the egalitarian in case symmetry is required. Some considerations on the Shapley value and the core solution are also discussed.
